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For many years it has been conventional historiographical wisdom
that a radical change in the interpretation of the Constitution's most sig-
nificant clauses dealing with political economy-the Commerce,' Con-
tracts,2 and Due Process Clauses3-took place in the years between 1937
and the close of the Second World War. This change is widely known as
the "constitutional revolution" of the New Deal period. One historian,
noting that between 1937 and 1946 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
thirty-two of its previous decisions, primarily in political economy cases,
has asserted that in 1937 the Court "began a revolution in jurisprudence
that ended, apparently forever, the reign of laissez-faire and legitimated
the arrival of the Leviathan State.'
At one level that assertion seems incontrovertible. For example, by
the 1940s, the Court had vitiated the use of the Contracts Clause as a bar-
rier against legislation "impairing the obligation" of contracts in existence
before the legislation's passage. 5 It had tacitly granted Congress nearly
unlimited power to regulate commerce and obliterated the established
doctrinal line between "direct" and "indirect" effects of an economic ac-
tivity on interstate commerce.6 Further, it had ceased to treat the Due
* University Professor and John B. Minor Professor of Law and History, University of
Virginia. My thanks to Barry Cushman, Howard Gillman, and John Harrison for their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Article. This Article was originally delivered as the inaugural
Jerome B. Hall lecture at Hastings College of the Law on March 24, 1997.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
3. U.S. CONST. Amendments 5 and 14.
4. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 233, 236 (1995).
5. See Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-46 (1934).
6. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119-23 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
Process Clauses as major barriers to redistributive social and economic
legislation, in the process abandoning the long-standing jurisprudential
distinction between "general" and "partial" legislation.7
The questions I address in this Article do not center on whether a
"constitutional revolution" occurred in the New Deal period, but rather
center on the form that revolution took, and why the revolution occurred.
Here one encounters the remnants of a conventional historiographical ex-
planation for the "revolution," which locates it in the economic disloca-
tions and political realignments of the 1930s and the Court's pragmatic
response to those developments. The conventional explanation assumes
that the "revolution" was externally produced. It allegedly was engen-
dered by the sharply critical public reaction to the Court's initial resis-
tance to New Deal legislation seeking to regulate the economy, a reaction
that manifested itself in the Roosevelt Administration's 1937 proposal to
change the size of the Supreme Court.8 The conventional explanation
also assumes that the "revolution" was historically inevitable in that the
jurisprudential positions advanced by the Court to buttress its initial op-
position to the New Deal were so outmoded and so inattentive to the con-
ditions of life in America in the 1930s, that they could not have been
maintained much longer even had the Court not experienced any direct
political pressure. 9
Although that conventional explanation is already arguably in tatters,
it seems appropriate to set it forth before attempting a further critique of
it.'o The salient questions for those who have subscribed to an externalist
explanation of the "constitutional revolution" have centered on the politi-
cal and economic features of American life when the "revolution" came
into being and on the Court's responsiveness to those features. The ac-
count proceeds as follows. The American economy underwent a severe
dislocation in the 1920s, producing among other things, a political rea-
lignment. Traditional conceptions of the role of government, especially
U.S. 111, 120-25 (1942).
7. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-400 (1937).
8. This theme is emphasized in LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 82-162.
9. This position is captured in a quotation from Robert G. McCloskey's THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT 175, 178 (Daniel J. Boorstin ed. 1960):
The depression, and the New Deal which was its reflex, were forces too cosmic for
those Canutes to withstand. Finally, the waves dislodged even the partial and contin-
gent grip on economic affairs that the judiciary had once enjoyed.... [Tihe extreme
negativist position of 1935-36 was forsaken, as it had to be....
10. See BARRY CUSHMAN, THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (forth-
coming 1998) [hereinafter CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION].
When Cushman's manuscript appears in book form, it will be titled RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION. For an earlier state-
ment of Cushman's critique of the conventional explanation, see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the
New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REv. 201 (1994) [hereinafter Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal
Court].
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the role of the federal government, proved inadequate to deal with the
depressed economy. New responses, featuring much greater federal
regulation of economic activities, were advanced by the Democratic party
under Roosevelt, whose composition and constituencies were themselves
products of the times. When the constitutionality of those responses was
challenged, the Supreme Court's existing jurisprudence set up barriers to
implementing the responses.
The result was a series of Court decisions crippling the New Deal's
early legislative initiatives, and triggering public revulsion against the
Court. Buoyed by a landslide victory in the 1936 election, Roosevelt at-
tempted to identify the Court as isolated from contemporary conditions
and its justices as subscribing to outmoded interpretations of the Consti-
tution. He sought to implement this view of the Court in his 1937 Court-
packing plan, providing for the appointment of additional justices if a sit-
ting justice declined to retire at the age of 70. Being political actors, the
justices realized that in order to retain the Court in its existing form they
would need to modify their attitude toward New Deal legislation, and af-
ter 1937 they did so, producing the "constitutional revolution.""
As structured, this explanation makes no serious effort to analyze the
language of the Court's opinions during the period of the "constitutional
revolution." It gives only cursory attention to the justices' rhetorical jus-
tifications for their initial opposition to or their subsequent legitimation of
New Deal regulatory measures. There are two reasons for this failure to
give close attention to the Court's opinions. One is that the account pro-
ceeds from a behaviorist model of judging, in which the rhetoric of judi-
cial reasoning is treated as mainly a smokescreen for political intuitions
and convictions, which are the "real" bases for decisions. The other is
that because the overwhelming number of commentators who constructed
the conventional explanation of the "constitutional revolution" approved
of the thrust of that "revolution," applauded an increased governmental
regulatory presence in the economy, and found the constitutional basis of
the Court's resistance to New Deal legislation incomprehensibly archaic,
these commentators did not feel it necessary to give more than cursory
attention to the "reactionary" jurisprudential attitudes identified with op-
ponents of early New Deal legislation.'2
11. This account, in a less caricatured version, has been made as recently as in
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 231-36.
12. The conventional explanation originated in the late 1930s and early 1940s, with such
works as EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938); EDWARD S. CORWIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941); BENjAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942); and ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941). It per-
sisted through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE
July 1997]
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Had those commentators investigated the rhetoric of the Court's
opinions on constitutional issues affecting government and the economy
around the time of the "constitutional revolution," they would have found
the sources of a quite different explanation of that development. First,
they would have found a constitutional analysis in which contemporary
social and political issues were reconfigured to take on particularistic le-
gal meanings, meanings that are not easily rendered in conventional po-
litical labels. 13
They would also have found a set of established interpretive princi-
ples, doctrines, and analogies within the analytical discourse of early
twentieth century constitutional jurisprudence that existed relatively inde-
pendently of the external context. in which the Supreme Court made deci-
sions in the 1930s. They would have come to realize that the principal
questions Supreme Court justices asked themselves, when presented with
a "novel" issue of constitutional interpretation caused by a pressing con-
temporary concern, centered on where the issue could be located within
their established analytical discourse. Seen from the justices' perspec-
tive, the issues coming to the Court were not so much social issues as is-
sues in legal interpretation, issues that they tried to characterize in the
terms of familiar jurisprudential categories.14
STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956); MCCLosKEY, supra note 9; and PAUL MURPHY, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969 (1972). It has even continued in some volumes
that appeared in the 1980s, such as PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS, 272-89
(1982). It remains in unreconstructed form in a recent 1995 work. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 4, at 82-162, 213-36. A modification of the unreconstructed account, relying on it but
questioning it at the same time, can be found in Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and the
Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEx. L. REV. 67, 102 & n.247 (1983).
Meanwhile, some recent revisionist work has begun to question the conventional explanation
around the edges, and, as noted, Barry Cushman has attacked it head-on. See Michael Ariens,
A Thrice Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 635-51 (1994); Richard D.
Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitu-
tional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV 1891, 1935-82 (1994). Cushman's STRUCTURE OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, contains versions of several of Cushman's
earlier articles, such as A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine
from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 105, 160 (1992) [hereinafter Cushman,
Stream of Legal Consciousness]; Doctrinal Synergies and Liberal Dilemmas: The Case of the
Yellow-Dog Contract, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 235, 293 [hereinafter Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies
and Liberal Dilemmas]; and Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, supra note 10, at 237-
61. In my view, the appearance of Cushman's manuscript in book form will signal the collapse
of the conventional explanation of the "constitutional revolution."
13. Cushman's work illustrates this point through a careful analysis of the Court's early
twentieth century Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause opinions. See CUSHMAN,
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 398-430.
14. Cushman has also sketched out this dimension of the Court's early twentieth century
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause jurisprudence. See id; Cushman, Stream of Legal
Consciousness, supra note 12; Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies and Liberal Dilemmas, supra note
12; Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, supra note 10.
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Finally, they would have found the existence of a "lost" attitude to-
ward constitutional interpretation itself, an attitude that is the focus of this
Article. That attitude toward interpretation, and the methodology accom-
panying it, was almost entirely abandoned by the Supreme Court by the
early 1940s, but the very abandonment of the attitude and methodology
has made it more difficult to reconstruct. This has led to a tendency on
the part of mid- and late-twentieth century commentators to ignore the
reasoning of cases identified with the "constitutional revolution," espe-
cially the rhetoric of justices opposing doctrinal change. If one returns to
that rhetoric, however, the "lost" attitude can be found intact.
The attitude can be captured in a jurisprudential proposition animat-
ing much of the resistance to New Deal legislative experimentation: the
proposition that the Constitution was not designed to change with time.
Its principles were foundationalist and thus its "meaning" fixed. Its
structure and language were not altered by events, rather they "accom-
modated" events. Events were seen as precipitating restatements of fun-
damental constitutional principles.
The "constitutional revolution" of the 1930s was not only a doctrinal
revolution but an interpretive revolution. As an interpretive revolution, it
altered the jurisprudential framework in which constitutional decisions on
government and the economy were set. More fundamentally, it altered
the professional function of the judge in constitutional interpretation.
Even more fundamentally, it altered the process by which "permanent"
legal texts, of which the Constitution was the cultural exemplar, were
read in American jurisprudence. It altered the meaning of constitutional
adaptivity.
The constitutional revolution, as an interpretive revolution, also had
significant practical ramifications. Prior to the late 1930s, Supreme
Court justices, in their roles as' interpreters of the Constitution, were seen
as guardians of fundamental constitutional principles, with many of these
principles seen as barriers against legislative excesses. Since then, judges
have been seen, at least in the realm of political economy, as partners
with legislatures to ensure that the Constitution is responsive to changing
economic and social conditions. An important function of judges in con-
stitutional cases affecting government and the economy has been to im-
plement an idea that became orthodoxy for the first time during the pe-
riod of the "constitutional revolution": the idea of the "living
Constitution." As a constitutional rubric, that idea signified an altered
view of the meaning of constitutional adaptivity. The emergence of that
view was at the very center of the transformation in constitutional inter-
pretation that took place during the New Deal period. 5
15. The phrase "living Constitution" has become so commonplace in late twentieth century
constitutional discourse that its comparatively recent historical origins may be overlooked. On
July 1997]
I. The Origins of the "Living Constitution" Rubric
A. A Methodological Overview
I will show that the "constitutional revolution" is best understood as
an interpretive revolution through looking at two closely related dimen-
sions of constitutional jurisprudence in the late 1930s and 1940s, neither
of which has been given much attention by the conventional externalist
account. One dimension has begun to be treated by revisionist critics of
the conventional account: the doctrinal discourse of Supreme Court jus-
tices addressing constitutional issues in political economy cases. I shall
defer my treatment of that area, which builds on the work of others, and
my treatment of cases will be selective. 16
The other dimension, which is my principal focus, is rhetoric in both
cases 17 and in scholarly literature addressing the role of the Constitution
in American culture. In particular, I investigate rhetorical characteriza-
tions of the nature of constitutional interpretation and of the relationship
of the Constitutional text to perceived external change in the realm of po-
litical economy: rhetoric directed toward the question of constitutional
adaptivity. Examining that rhetoric discloses an alteration in the domi-
the recent ubiquity of the phrase, see William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitu-
tion, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 693-95 (1976).
In my exploration of the historical origins of the phrase I profited from an unpublished pa-
per by Howard Gillman presented to the Western Political Science Association. Howard Gill-
man, The Problem of Political Development for Constitutional Theory: The Collapse of Foun-
dationalist Constitutionalism and the Origins of the Concept of the Living Constitution (April
1995) (on file with the author and Hastings Law Journal) [hereinafter Gillman, Problem of Po-
litical Development]. I am indebted to Professor Gillman for first drawing my attention to sev-
eral of the sources I discuss in connection with the debate over the meaning of constitutional
adaptivity in the 1920s and 1930s. Although Professor Gillman's explanation of the signifi-
cance of that debate differs from the explanation I advance in this Article, we both recognize
the significance of the episode in an intellectual history of twentieth-century constitutional inter-
pretation that culminated in the "constitutional revolution."
Several additional works addressing issues in twentieth-century constitutional history, most
prominently MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 219-54 (1986), demonstrate an awareness of many of
the sources I discuss in connection with the "living Constitution" rubric. Nonetheless, so far as
I am aware, Professor Gillman's paper represents the first sustained effort to connect those
sources to the "constitutional revolution" itself.
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. The term "commentary" is typically separated from "cases." I have retained that
separation for convenience, but in one sense it is an artificial one for my purposes. I am inves-
tigating rhetorical examples of an attitude toward interpretation made by both "commentators"
and judges. When made by judges, such statements often are not intended to have precise doc-
trinal significance: they are "metadoctrinal," or "predoctrinal." I think it obscures their sig-
nificance to call them "doctrine" merely because they are formulated by judges in the context of
cases.
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nant image of the Constitution during the period of the "constitutional
revolution," from that of a timeless document embodying fundamental
precepts of American government to that of a "living" document whose
textual provisions were capable of accommodating the constantly chang-
ing features of twentieth century American culture.
I conclude that with the emergence of the idea that the Constitution
was a "living" document came a potentially radical constriction in the
role of judges as constitutional interpreters, at least in the realm of politi-
cal economy.18 Judges had previously been deemed the primary archi-
tects of the Constitution as a timeless repository of fundamental wisdom:
as "countermajoritarian" or antimajoritarian forces in the American sys-
tem of government. The new conception of the Constitution questioned
the degree to which judges as members of an unelected elite could serve
as effective interpreters of the majoritarian policies of a democratic soci-
ety, policies to which a "living" Constitution should conform.
All of the features of the interpretive revolution that will subse-
quently be set forth-the abandonment of categorist methodology in cases
involving government and the economy, the emergence of judicial defer-
ence as an approved stance for the Court in reviewing regulatory and
distributive legislation, the development of prudentialist and pragmatic
judicial readings of constitutional language, and above all the idea that the
meaning of the Constitution is supposed to change with time-can be as-
sociated with an altered epistemological sensibility, one that attributed
much greater causal significance to the purposive activities of human ac-
tors as shaping forces in the universe. Once judges and commentators
came to believe that the flow of time could be linear, even progressive,
rather than cyclical, that events need not repeat themselves, and that hu-
mans could alter or reduce the power of supposedly inexorable external
forces in the universe, the idea of the Constitution as an embodiment of
permanent truths became far less compelling.' 9
18. One of the paradoxical features of the emergence of this constricted role for judges as
constitutional interpreters was that it was not taken to apply to the realm of free speech. For an
extended discussion of this paradox, see G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of
Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 299
(1996) [hereinafter White, First Amendment Comes ofAge].
19. This is another in a series of Articles in which I have sought to explain the significant
changes that took place in American law and jurisprudence during the period between World
War I and World War II by setting those changes in the framework of changing patterns of
epistemology in American culture during those years. My analysis rests on two fundamental
propositions: first, that what I call a "premodernist" consciousness about causal attribution in
the universe and human governance persisted in American jurisprudence much later than has
commonly been supposed; and second, that a "modernist" consciousness about causal attribu-
tion and human governance did not become orthodoxy among elite policymakers until the New
Deal period. For definitions of "premodernist" and "modernist" epistemology, see G. Edward
White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70
July 1997]
In short, I suggest that the emergence of modernist consciousness as
an epistemological orthodoxy rendered obsolete an older conception of
constitutional adaptivity and an associated theory of the judge's role in
constitutional interpretation.
B. The Emergence of the "Living Constitution" Rubric: Commentary in
the 1920s20
By the 1920s, commentators had begun to articulate a conception of
the Constitution as a "living" document, one whose meaning was capable
of changing with time. The phrase "living Constitution," as it surfaced
in commentary, combined two dimensions of constitutional interpretation.
One, the explicit focus of the commentary, was the dimension of consti-
tutional adaptability. Ascribing adaptability to the Constitution had been
a time-honored practice in American constitutional jurisprudence, dating
at least to John Marshall's celebrated dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland
in which he described a Constitution as intrinsically capable of being
"adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 21 By the 1920s, that
sense of adaptability was being used by some jurists to buttress the argu-
ment that the fundamental principles of the Constitution did not change
with time. This argument was faithful to Marshall's meaning of adapt-
ability: the equivalent of a restatement of first principles in new con-
texts. 22 Others, however, took adaptability to mean something quite dif-
ferent: that constitutional principles themselves could be modified to suit
the demands of contemporary life. The second meaning of adaptability
signified a radically different set of assumptions about the nature of con-
stitutional interpretation.
The other dimension of the "living Constitution" rubric was that the
Constitution was to be interpreted by human beings. This was the less
explicit, more fundamental, and more radical dimension. A staple of tra-
ditional constitutional jurisprudence was the distinction between a gov-
ernment of laws and a government of men. American constitutional re-
publicanism was an embodiment of the former type of government, as
evidenced by an enduring written Constitution. In fact, the reason that
constitutional principles were to be taken as fundamental and unchanging
N.Y.U. L. REV. 573, 579 n.l1 (1995) [hereinafter White, Canonization of Holmes and Bran-
deis]; White, First Amendment Comes ofAge, supra note 18, at 303-06; G. Edward White, The
American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REv. 1,
14-16, 24-26 (1997).
20. Some of the sources discussed in this section were first called to my attention in How-
ard Gillman's unpublished paper. See Gillman, Problem of Political Development, supra note
15; see also KAMMEN, supra note 15, at 219-33, 251-54.
21. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
22. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 21-22 (1976) [herein-
after WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION].
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was because otherwise America would cease to be a government of laws.
The distinctions between "the will of the law" and "the will of the
Judge," as Marshall put it in another of his famous opinions,' or be-
tween law declaration and lawmaking, or between "interpreting" and
"amending" the Constitution, were premised on the conviction that the
Constitution was a discernible body of supreme law binding on those who
interpreted it, rather than, as Charles Evans Hughes put it in 1907, "what
the judges say it is."'24
Despite repeated judicial pronouncements that courts "make no
laws[,]... establish no policy, [and]... never enter into the domain of
public action" because "[t]heir functions ... are limited to seeing that
popular action does not trespass upon right and justice as it exists in
written constitutions and natural law,"' an increasing number of early
twentieth century commentators began to assert that laws were made by
humans and thus the distinction between a government of laws and a gov-
ernment of men was potentially meaningless.26 This assertion can be
readily associated with the surfacing of modernist epistemological prem-
ises among intellectuals in the first decades of this century, because a
central element of modernism was the transfer of causal attribution in the
universe from inexorable external forces to human will. The assertion of
the primacy of human-centered causation, at least in the realm of law,
was highly threatening and sharply contested in that period.
As the Supreme Court began to confront New Deal legislation in the
1930s, those who found that the legislation subverted constitutional prin-
ciples continued to affirm the inexorability of external causal phenomena.
John W. Davis, in the course of attacking New Deal experiments in eco-
nomic regulation in 1934, said, "Who can doubt that there are natural
laws in the social and economic as well as the physical worlds, and that
these cannot be overridden without courting disaster?"27 Thirteen years
earlier, U.S. Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland had given a
speech before the New York State Bar Association in which he made the
same point more elaborately:
There is nothing more unfortunate in governmental ad-
ministration than a policy of playing fast and loose with
23. Osborn v. U.S. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
24. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (May 3,
1907), in CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 133, 139 (1908).
25. Justice David Brewer, The Movement of Coercion, Address Before the New York
State Bar Association (1893), quoted in WHrTE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note
22, at 145.
26. Alternative readings of several of the sources treated in this section can be found in
KAMMEN, supra note 15, at 224-38, and Gillman, Problem of Political Development, supra
note 15.
27. Text of J. W. Davis's Attack on the New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1934, at 14.
July 19971
great economic and political principles which have with-
stood the strain of changing circumstance and the stress
of time and have become part of our fundamental wis-
dom .... Conditions which such a principle governs
may change-indeed, in this forward moving world of
ours, they must change-but the principle itself is immu-
table .... [T]here are certain fundamental social and
economic laws which are beyond the power, and certain
underlying governmental principles, which are beyond
the right of official control, and any attempt to interfere
with their operation inevitably ends in confusion, if not
disaster.28
In the 1920s, the appearance of two books on the Constitution dem-
onstrated that the jurisprudence of constitutional interpretation was in
considerable ferment, and that the fissures between opposing camps ran
very deep. The first book was The Constitution of the United States by
James M. Beck, Solicitor General of the United States.29 Originally
based on lectures delivered at Gray Inn, London, in June of 1922, the
book appeared in numerous editions. 30 The book was intended for lay
audiences and had sold over 50,000 copies by 1928, thanks in part to
subsidies by the Treasury Department, the Victor Talking Machine Com-
pany, and the National Security League.3'
Beck's treatment of the Constitution, which he described as a docu-
ment embodying "a great spirit" of "conservative self-restraint,"32 struck
a deep nerve among some of his contemporaries. The New York lawyer
William Nelson Cromwell wrote Beck that he had revealed to him "the
wonders of that inspired document, just as men of genius are constantly
revealing to use the wonders of the Scriptures." 33 President Warren
Harding called it "an educational effort which fittingly complements the
patriotic work of the League [of Nations]," 34 and President Calvin Coo-
lidge wrote a foreword to the Victory Talking Machine Company's spe-
cial edition, designed for schools and libraries, stressing that reverence
for the Constitution was the equivalent to support for "a government of
28. Address by George Sutherland, 44 REP. N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N 262, 263, 265 (1921).
29. JAMES M. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1924 ed.).
30. The book appeared in a 1922 English edition, a 1923 American edition, an expanded
1924 edition, a paperback version in 1925, and an abridged version in 1927.
31. MORTON KELLER, IN DEFENSE OF YESTERDAY: JAMES M. BECK AND THE POLITICS
OF CONSERVATISM, 1861-1936 157-59 (1958).
32. BECK, supra note 29, at 151-52.
33. Letter from William Nelson Cromwell to James Beck (Mar. 23, 1924), James M.
Beck Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University, quoted in KELLER, supra note 31, at
159.
34. JAMES M. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES vii (1923 ed.).
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law. " " Senator William E. Borah, in a 1924 letter, said that he wished
Beck's book "could be in the hands of every young person in the United
States," because "God knows how dearly we need a constitutional re-
vival."36 Even H.L. Mencken referred to The Constitution of the United
States as "an excellent piece of work.""
For progressive modernists of the time, such as Felix Frankfurter,
Walter Lippmann, and Harold Laski, Beck's book embodied the kind of
indiscriminately pious devotion to constitutional "principles" that they felt
was such a deterrent to enlightened judicial decisionmaking. In two re-
views of successive editions of The Constitution of the United States,
Thomas Reed Powell, known for his penetrating critiques of traditionalist
rhetoric in Court opinions, turned his powers of ridicule on Beck.38 In
the first of the reviews he likened Beck's work to a "prayer book," de-
signed to elicit a "mystical adulation of the Constitution in the pious faith
that it contains in itself the saving grace that will shield the interests of
the worshippers from the ambitions of those whose interests are ad-
verse." Noting that Beck had likened the Constitution to a floating dock,
remaining secure in its moorings while adjusting to the tides, Powell said
that Beck's "idea seems to be that while [the Constitution] does not move
forward or backward, it jiggles up and down." 39 His second review
opened with the sentences, "The new book which Mr. Beck has written
about the Constitution is a very different kind of book. You can read it
without thinking. "'
Powell's was not the only public criticism of Beck that appeared.
The Nation, the New York Times, the New York Tribune, the New York
Evening Post, and the New York Call also voiced dissatisfaction with
what they took to be his indiscriminate worship of the past, with the
Times calling him one of the "high priests" of constitutional fetishism. 4'
35. Calvin Coolidge, Foreword to BECK, supra note 29, at v, vi.
36. Letter from William E. Borah to James M. Beck (Dec. 4, 1924), quoted in KELLER,
supra note 31, at 159.
37. Letter from H.L. Mencken to James M. Beck (Dec. 12, 1924), quoted in KELLER,
supra note 31, at 159.
38. Thomas Reed Powell, Constitutional Interpretation and Misinterpretation, NEW
REPUBLIC 297 (1923) (reviewing JAMES M. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
(1922 ed.)) [hereinafter Powell, Constitutional Interpretation and Misinterpretation]; Thomas
Reed Powell, Constitutional Metaphors, NEW REPUBLIC 314 (1925) (reviewing JAMES M.
BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1924 ed.)) [hereinafter Powell, Constitu-
tional Metaphors]. The second review provoked Fred Rodell, a Yale law professor who gener-
ated his own reputation for vitriolically amusing reviews, to call it "my favorite review of all
time." Letter from Fred Rodell to Thomas Reed Powell (June 1936), quoted in KAMMEN, su-
pra note 15, at 249.
39. Powell, Constitutional Interpretation and Misinterpretation, supra note 38, at 297-98.
40. Powell, Constitutional Metaphors, supra note 38, at 314.
41. See Boyqu6 Jean, American Government, THE NATION, 436, 436-37 (1923) (review-
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The feature of Beck's work that particularly irritated his critics was his
blithe conviction that the principles of the Constitution were timeless.
The critics felt that Beck's principles bore a remarkable resemblance to
"what conservative lawyers conceived [the Constitution] to be about
1901.,"42
Some of the reaction to Beck, who was closely identified with the
center of the Republican party in the 1920s, was simple partisanship. But
another theme of Beck's critics-his simple-mindedness-was more than
just a reaction to his unsophisticated style of prose. The line of criticism
embodied by Powell's reviews suggested that Beck's assertions about
constitutional principles existing independent of the views of those
charged with interpreting the Constitution amounted to jurisprudential
nalvet6. 43 His critics believed that by caricaturing the argument that
America was a government of "laws" rather than "men," Beck had dem-
onstrated its essential emptiness. Law was itself the creation of humans,
taking on the character of its changing context and the changing theories
of governance which accompanied that context.
From the perspective of his critics, Beck's theory of constitutional
interpretation had confused permanence with fundamentality. They con-
ceded that in the American system of government, the Constitution was a
"fundamental" document, the ultimate source of legal authority. They
granted that American republicanism presupposed the necessity for such a
document because it was predicated on the people having consented to be
ruled by some authority. They could understand that it was fundamental
to a republican system of government that there be tacit agreement among
"the people" as to the existence of a supreme governing document and a
body, the Supreme Court of the United States, whose interpretations of it
would be regarded as authoritative.
But Beck's critics asserted that judges, as constitutional interpreters,
were not simply mouthpieces for preexisting legal principles. This was
especially apparent in closely divided cases, where five Supreme Court
justices thought a particular law could not be reconciled with the text of
the Constitution, and was thus invalid, while four justices thought it was
valid. In such cases one group of humans had made the law-the legis-
lators who had drafted and enacted it-and another group had "unmade"
ing JAMES M. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1922)); William Mac-
Donald, Mr. Beck Draws an Indictment Against a Whole People, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1924 at
3 (reviewing JAMES M. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1922)); KELLER,
supra note 31, at 296 (noting the negative reviews of Beck's book appearing during 1923 in the
New York Tribune, the New York Evening Post, and the New York Call).
42. Letter from Karl Llewellyn to Edward Corwin (Aug. 11, 1936), quoted in KAMMEN,
supra note 15, at 249.
43. See Powell, Constitutional Interpretation and Misinterpretation, supra note 38; Pow-
ell, Constitutional Metaphors, supra note 38.
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it-the five justices who concluded that it was unconstitutional. To
equate the process of constitutional interpretation with the "discovery" of
preexisting legal principles made no sense in such cases, for if one of the
justices who found the law unconstitutional changed his view, the
"meaning" of the Constitution would have been different.'
The above arguments were crystallized in a book appearing in 1927
entitled The Living Constitution, written by Howard Lee McBain, a pro-
fessor at Columbia Law School.4 s Its purpose was to demonstrate that
"judges are men.., made of human stuff like the rest of us and sharing
with us the common limitations and frailties of human nature," and that
"[1]aws are man-made, man-executed, man-interpreted. '4 6 The distinc-
tion between a government of laws and a government of men was "ab-
surd" to McBain.47 "Laws," he maintained, "live only because men live
and only to the extent that men will to have them live. Apart from men,
a government of laws is a thing inert, a thing that is harmless because
useless, a thing that has no existence outside the realm of imagination." 4"
Thus, the Constitution could not be seen as "handed down on Mount Si-
nai by the Lord God of Hosts," but as "human means," revealing that
"nothing that is human is infallible, and that governments, whatever their
form, are only as moral as those who hold the throttle of power at the
moment. "9
C. Constitutional Adaptivity and the Interpretive Revolution: Two
Paradigm Cases
The different views expressed by Beck and McBain with respect to
the "meaning" of the Constitution and to the distinction between a gov-
ernment of laws and one of men framed a debate over the nature of con-
stitutional interpretation that took place in the 1920s and 1930s. On one
side of the debate were those who continued to deny that the meaning of
the Constitution could change with time and continued to believe that ju-
dicial interpretation was not the equivalent of judicial lawmaking. On the
other were advocates of a "living" Constitution, who saw the process of
constitutional interpretation as organic and human-crafted.
Two types of exercises in constitutional interpretation by the Su-
preme Court were at the center of the debate. One set involved applica-
tions of constitutional provisions to circumstances that the framers could
44. See, e.g., Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37
HARV. L. REV. 545, 545-46 (1924).
45. HOWARD L. McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (1927).
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 272.
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not have contemplated, such as Olmstead v. United States.50 There, fed-
eral agents installed wiretaps in the basement of bootlegger Roy Olm-
stead's office building and in the street near his home."' Based on the
wiretaps, the agents secured evidence that helped to convict Olmstead for
a violation of the Volstead Act, which prohibited the sale or manufacture
of intoxicating liquors.5 2 Olmstead challenged the conviction on the
grounds that the wiretapping, which was undertaken without a search
warrant, violated his Fourth Amendment protection against unauthorized
searches and seizures.53
A five man majority of the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Taft, upheld the conviction.54 The Fourth Amendment prohibited unrea-
sonable searches and seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and effects,"
and the wiretaps had not been installed on any of Olmstead's property."
Thus, no trespass had taken place and a warrant was not required.16 Jus-
tice Brandeis, in dissent, argued that "every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."57
The fundamental interpretive issue in Olmstead, as noted, was
whether a constitutional provision could be applied to cover a situation
outside the consciousness of its drafters. The language "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" in the Fourth Amendment suggested that its context
was unauthorized trespasses onto property, and the framers had no ink-
ling of the technology that produced electronic eavesdropping. In the late
eighteenth century few mechanisms existed for invading the privacy of
others except unauthorized trespasses. So the ultimate interpretive ques-
tion in Olmstead was whether textual provisions of the Constitution, such
as the Fourth Amendment, could be read as "adaptable" only in Mar-
shall's sense, as linguistic skins that could be stretched but not stretched
beyond recognition, or "adaptable" in a modem sense as terms of art for
which later humans could substitute other terms. Taft, for the majority,
read the Fourth Amendment as providing safeguards against only those
unreasonable intrusions that invaded a citizen's person, home, papers, or
effects. He suggested that although "the Fourth Amendment [is] to be
liberally construed to effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution
in the interest of liberty," that could not "justify enlargement of the lan-
guage employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, per-
50. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
51. Id. at 456-57.
52. Id. at 457.
53. Id. at 455.
54. Id. at 466.
55. Id. at 457, 466.
56. Id. at 466.
57. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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sons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as
to forbid hearing or sight."58
Brandeis's dissent announced that the Constitution "must have
a... capacity of adaptation to a changing world," and "its general lan-
guage should not.., be necessarily confined to the form that evil
had... taken [to the framers]." 59  Because "[time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes," a constitutional prin-
ciple, "to be vital[,] must be capable of wider application than the mis-
chief which gave it birth."60 This was an articulation of the modem ver-
sion of adaptability.
The next set of troublesome cases brought the clash between advo-
cates of a fixed Constitution and advocates of a "living" Constitution
even more clearly into the open. This set was composed of cases where
the language of a constitutional provision, coupled with its context, made
the framers' intent abundantly clear, and yet adherence to that intent be-
cause of changed circumstances produced an extremely awkward policy
outcome. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell 61 was such a
case. It was one of the early signals of a forthcoming "constitutional
revolution" in the realm of political economy.
The depressed economic conditions of the 1930s had resulted in a
number of homeowners being unable to meet mortgage payments on their
houses, with the result that many were threatened with foreclosure. Min-
nesota responded to this situation by passing "emergency" legislation that
enabled courts to postpone deadlines for mortgage redemption.' In
Blaisdell, a homeowner's deadline was extended under the statute, and
the mortgagor sued to compel foreclosure, arguing that the statute was
unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause of the Constitution,6 which
provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass any ... law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts."6
The Contracts Clause of the Constitution was designed precisely to
respond to the situation present in Blaisdell, where a legislature inter-
vened to protect debtors against creditors. Prior to the framing of the
Constitution, debtor relief laws, which postponed the time for payment of
debts or altered the currency they could be paid in, had been common in
the states. Some of the framers felt that this situation was deleterious to
commercial development, and others were sympathetic to the interests of
58. Id. at 465.
59. Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910)).
60. Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 373).
61. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
62. Id. at 415-16.
63. Id. at 418-19.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
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creditors. There was agreement that the Constitution should curb the op-
portunities of state legislatures to interfere with private contractual ar-
rangements. 6s
In the course of the Court's development of Contracts Clause juris-
prudence, it became clear that although debtor relief laws were invalid,
the states retained power to vitiate certain contractual agreements, on
grounds of public policy, such as those involving transactions to partici-
pate in illegal activity.' Despite this concession, the Contracts Clause
remained an important barrier to legislative regulation as long as the
sphere of state police powers remained relatively confined. By the time
of the Blaisdell decision, however, the scope of the police power had be-
come a central question of constitutional jurisprudence. 67
Writing for the 5-4 majority of the Court, Hughes's opinion sus-
taining the Minnesota statute proceeded on the assumption that Contracts
Clause cases had now become analogous to police power Due Process
cases, exercises in "harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the
necessary residuum of state power. "6 That statement itself was interest-
ing, because the Contracts Clause represented a much more explicit pro-
tection of private rights than the Due Process Clauses. But Hughes bor-
rowed from Due Process analysis in formulating the Court's methodology
in Contracts Clause cases, which he described as an inquiry into
"whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures
taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end." 69
Hughes then described the altered economic conditions and altered
perceptions about those conditions that formed the context of "emer-
gency" measures such as that adopted by Minnesota:
65. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 4-5
(1938).
66. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818-19 (1879) (upholding state law that
invalidated corporate charters authorizing lottery enterprises); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473, 483 (1905) (upholding state law that invalidated contract relating to damming of a naviga-
ble stream).
67. The emergence of the concept of the "police power" in nineteenth century constitu-
tional jurisprudence is sketched in HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) [hereinafter
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED]. See also CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 152-69, and Charles McCurdy, The Liberty
of Contract Regime in American Law, in FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND THE STATE (Harry
Scheiber, ed., forthcoming 1997). I make use of these sources in a recent argument that
Holmes's celebrated dissent in Lochner v. New York has been misunderstood. See G. Edward
White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process].
68. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435.
69. Id. at 438.
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There has been a growing appreciation of public needs and of the ne-
cessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual
rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent contraction of
the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing density of
population, the interrelation of the activities of our people and the com-
plexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to an increased
use of the organization of society in order to protect the very bases of
individual opportunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only
the concerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those
of the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been found
that the fundamental interests of the State are directly affected; and that
the question is no longer merely that of one party to a contract as
against another, but of the use of reasonable means to safeguard the
economic structure upon which the good of all depends.70
Thus it was clear that context, not fixed constitutional principles,
would be controlling in Blaisdell. But what of the fact that the Contracts
Clause was unambiguously designed to prevent the very legislative inter-
vention being challenged in that case? What of the fact that the statute
was a debtor relief law, however it was characterized, one by which the
state was intervening to change the terms of preexisting contractual obli-
gations? Blaisdell did not involve a constitutional provision where the
framers had articulated a general principle, such as protection from gov-
ernment intrusion, without contemplating the particular circumstances to
which that principle might be applied. It was a case in which the fram-
ers had articulated a principle (the state may not interfere with preexisting
private contracts), having a particular context in mind (debtor relief
laws), and that very context had occurred.
Hughes was thus squarely confronted between an interpretive theory
of the Constitution that saw its meaning as fixed, albeit capable of adap-
tation, and an interpretive theory-the "living Constitution" theory-that
treated the meaning of the Constitution as capable of radically changing
with time. The result reached by the Hughes majority in Blaisdell could
only mean that the Contracts Clause of the Constitution did not mean in
1934 what it had meant for the past 150 years. As Hughes put it:
It is no answer... to insist that what the provision of the Constitution
meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time.
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its
adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of
the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the fram-
ers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed
upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard
against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the
memorable warning-"We must never forget that it is a constitution we
70. Id. at 442.
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are expounding-a constitution intended to endure for ages to come and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. "
In the above paragraph, instead of contrasting two interpretive theo-
ries of the Constitution, Hughes acted as if they were two ways of ex-
pressing the same theory. However, in traditional constitutional inter-
pretation as it existed in the 1920s and 1930s, there was a world of
difference between the two meanings of adaptability, between treating the
Constitution's principles as enduring through adaptation to new condi-
tions and treating those principles as changing in response to those condi-
tions. Hughes was not merely suggesting in Blaisdell that the principle of
protecting private contract-making from governmental interference was
being applied to circumstances in which the social impact of mortgage
foreclosures was wider than previously perceived. He was suggesting
that the expanded social impact of mortgage foreclosures called for a re-
thinking of the principle itself. He was suggesting, in other words, that
the Contracts Clause meant something different in the American economy
of the 1930s from what it previously had meant.
A concurrence originally filed by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in the
Blaisdell case illustrates that this was Hughes's meaning. In that concur-
rence, Cardozo had written as follows:
The decisions brought together by the Chief Justice show with impres-
sive force how the court in its interpretation of the contract clause has
been feeling its way toward a rational compromise between private
rights and public welfare. From the beginning it was seen that some-
thing must be subtracted from the words of the Constitution in all their
literal and stark significance .... [A] promise exchanged between in-
dividuals was not to paralyze the state in its endeavor in times of direful
crisis to keep its life-blood flowing.
To hold this may be inconsistent with things that men said in 1787 when
expounding to compatriots the newly written constitution. They did not
see the changes in the relation between states and nation or in the play
of social forces that lay hidden in the womb of time. It may be incon-
sistent with things that they believed or took for granted. Their beliefs
to be significant must be adjusted to the world they knew. 72
Eventually Cardozo withdrew his concurrence and joined Hughes's
Blaisdell opinion.' 3
Justice Sutherland, dissenting in Blaisdell, had no difficulty identi-
fying the novel character of Hughes's theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion. He declared:
71. Id. at 442-43 (citations omitted).
72. WALTER F. MURPHY, ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 138
(1986). Cardozo's concurrence, which Justice Harlan Fiske Stone had apparently edited, was
found in Stone's papers by Professor Alpheus Thomas Mason when Mason was working on his
biography of Stone, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law. Id. at 138-39.
73. Id.
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A provision of the Constitution does not admit of two distinctly opposite
interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely
different thing at another time. If the contract impairment clause, when
framed and adopted, meant that the terms of a contract for the payment
of money could not be altered... by a state statute enacted for the re-
lief of hardly pressed debtors to the end and with the effect of postpon-
ing payment or enforcement during and because of an economic or fi-
nancial emergency, it is but to state the obvious to say that it means the
same now.
74
In Sutherland's comments one can see the fundamental incompatibil-
ity of the two theories of constitutional interpretation being advanced in
Blaisdell. However, if Sutherland is correct that the meaning of the Con-
stitution does not fundamentally change, one encounters what contempo-
rary commentators have called the "dead hand" overtones of the consti-
tutional text.75 "Dead hand" overtones arise where the framers of a
constitutional provision had anticipated the very circumstance to which
the provision should be applied, and the Framers's views are then ac-
cepted. In such instances, the policies of past generations control those
of the present.
The "dead hand" overtones of the interpretive theory articulated by
Sutherland in Blaisdell are instinctively repugnant to modem thinkers.
But if one holds a different epistemology with a different conception of
"law," the dead hand problem dissolves. Under that conception, "law"
is a body of timeless rules and principles, reflecting inexorable truths in
the universe. From this perspective, the Contracts Clause is merely a
codification of the truth that humans enter society with certain inalienable
rights, such as the right to make formal arrangements to transact their af-
fairs (contracts), and government exists to secure those rights, not to in-
fringe upon them. By including the Contracts Clause in the Constitution,
the framers were not so much imposing their view of debtor-creditor re-
lations on future generations as committing to written form some funda-
mental truths of political economy and government. That was all "law"
was, a collection of such truths appearing in the form of doctrines, rules,
and principles.
Once one adopted the assumptions of McBain's The Living Constitu-
tion,7 6 however, the "dead hand" problem came to haunt any theory of
constitutional interpretation that emphasized the "original intent" of the
framers. If law was made by humans, it was not the equivalent of time-
less, disembodied truth. Rather, it was the equivalent of the current pol-
icy preferences of lawmakers, including those who "interpreted" law
rather than explicitly making it. The assumption that law was created by
74. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448-49 (Sutherland, I., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., Michael Kiarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 381 (1997).
76. See MCBAIN, supra note 45.
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humans rather than a distillation of externally generated truths made the
idea that constitutional principles had a fixed meaning problematic.
In his dissent in Blaisdell, Sutherland had argued that "[t]he defense
of the Minnesota law [had been] made upon grounds which were dis-
countenanced by the makers of the Constitution."' Because in the Blais-
dell case that defense had been resurrected "by an appeal to facts and cir-
cumstances identical with those which brought it into existence," it was
not acceptable.7" To Sutherland and the other dissenters, accepting that
defense required that "conditions which produced the rule may now be
invoked to destroy it."7 9 But for those who adopted Hughes's theory of
constitutional interpretation, the important point was that humans had
changed their mind about the cultural significance of those facts and cir-
cumstances. In light of the newly perceived social consequences of debt
in America of the 1930s, the Contracts Clause had become less of an em-
bodiment of fundamental principles of republican government and more
of a barrier against efforts to alleviate the social costs of a depressed
economy. Its meaning had changed, and humans were free to instill that
meaning into law.
The idea of a "living Constitution," in which the meaning of the
language could change to accommodate not only changed conditions but
changed perceptions of the relationship of constitutional provisions to
those conditions, was not without its own problems. Although it
"solved" the "dead hand" problem, it introduced others. Foremost
among them, for mid-twentieth century commentators, was the problem
of finding appropriate justifications authorizing judicial interpreters of the
Constitution to change its meaning. Judges from Marshall through Suth-
erland had responded to the question of judicial legitimacy by maintaining
that they were simply declaring or adapting received constitutional wis-
dom; they were not "lawmakers" in the legislative sense. However,
when the Supreme Court in Blaisdell explicitly rejected an interpretation
of a constitutional provision in precisely the same circumstances in which
that interpretation had been advanced, it was hard to imagine, in a twen-
tieth century epistemological universe, what else its members were doing
except making new law. Justices no longer appeared as officials charged
with the duty of articulating preexisting first principles in a republic; the
Constitution had become, to many observers, what judges said it was. 0
77. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 472 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. One might be inclined to think that judges adopting the "living Constitution" rubric in
the 1930s were saying something different: that the Constitution was what Congress and state
legislatures said it was. A posture of reflexive deference to the legislature on constitutional
questions might not, after all, be inconsistent with a view of judicial lawmaking as a contradic-
tion in terms. However, this line of reasoning has to cope with the expanded role of the Su-
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D. The "Living Constitution" in the New Deal Years
Judicial legitimacy in a world in which judges were presumed to be
a species of lawmaker was at the center of constitutional theory in the
years after Blaisdell. In the 1930s, the clash between interpretive theo-
ries of the Constitution had not yet been resolved. However, little by lit-
tle, the interpretive posture represented by Hughes in Blaisdell began to
prevail. That development can be associated with a confluence of two
trends, one taking place within the Court and the other external to it, in
the world of commentary. These trends will be discussed in reverse or-
der.
(1) Commentary in the 1930s81
Between the appearance of Beek's The Constitution of the United
States and the mid-1930s, the question of the proper role of the Constitu-
tion in American society was a recurrent subject of academic debate.
Discussion centered on two issues: whether the Constitution, given the
altered conditions of modem America, had become "obsolete," and, if
so, what should be done about it. On one side of the debate were com-
mentators such as Beck and Charles W. Pierson, who in a 1926 book,
Our Changing Constitution, took note of "the drift toward centralization"
that was occurring in governmental policy and expressed concern that in
"moving forward with conscious power toward the achievement of their
aims," the American people would give insufficient attention to the con-
stitutional legitimacy of centralizing policies.' Pierson stressed the Con-
stitution's capacity to adapt to change, and insisted that experiments with
centralization should have a proper constitutional basis, by which he
meant a basis consistent with the traditional assumptions of republican
government. 83 He suggested the slogan "Back to the Constitution" as a
rallying cry for those who desired renewed attention to it.'
preme Court in First Amendment cases and other "noneconomic liberty" cases from the early
1930s. For an extended discussion, see White, First Amendment Comes ofAge, supra note 18,
at 327-42. In this context the now reflexive citation of footnote four in United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), can be seen as one of the earliest internaliza-
tions of the "living Constitution" rubric by a Court majority.
81. A number of the sources discussed and quoted in this section were first brought to my
attention by Gillman's unpublished paper. See Gillman, Problem of Political Development,
supra note 15. I have on some occasions selected passages from those sources that were also
selected by Gillman. In such instances the quoted passages served my purposes as well as those
of Professor Gillman, but he should be credited for pointing me in their direction. Some of the
sources are also discussed and quoted in KAMMEN, supra note 15, at 248-54.
82. CHARLES W. PIERSON, OUR CHANGING CONsTrrTION 143 (1926).
83. Id. at 144.
84. Id. at 151.
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On the other side were a variety of commentators who embraced one
or another versions of the "living Constitution" theory. Some argued that
the Constitution had become obsolete in the 1930s, and advocated
amending its provisions or interpreting them out of existence.85 Others
embraced the "dead hand" critique, claiming, as Professor Jesse H.
Holmes put it, that "[o]ur forefathers didn't know anything about a
country of 120,000,000 people, with automobiles, trains, and radios."86
Still others found the ideological presuppositions on which many consti-
tutional provisions were grounded inappropriately elitist or libertarian for
a modem democratic society.87
As late as 1936, the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence thought that the debate over the proper role of the Constitution was
still sufficiently unresolved to devote a symposium to the topic. That
symposium featured commentators who believed that the Constitution's
greatest strength was its combination of permanent principles and adapt-
able language, and who worried about recent efforts to ignore its limita-
tions on the power of the national government. 8 However, other com-
mentators in the symposium openly endorsed the "living Constitution"
perspective, with Charles Beard writing that "[s]ince most of the words
and phrases dealing with the powers and the limits of government are
vague and must in practice be interpreted by human beings, it follows
that the Constitution as practice is a living thing."89
These opposing viewpoints were summarized by one symposium
participant, Johns Hopkins political science professor James Hart, as
follows:
Whoever would be consistent in his thinking about the Constitution must
choose between two fundamentally different philosophies .... The one
assumes a dynamic universe in which new factors and hence new prob-
lems emerge. The other postulates a universe whose very changes take
place in accordance with a few unchanging principles. The first recog-
nizes the necessity of choice in the application to new situations of the
lessons of the past, and hence regards principles as "methods by which
the net value of past experience is rendered available for present scr-
tiny of new perplexities." The second treats principles as the unambi-
85. E.g., Henry Hazlitt, Our Obsolete Constitution, THE NATION, 124, 124-25 (1931).
86. Urges Abolishing of the Constitution, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 28, 1931, at 12 (reporting on
a speech given by Dr. Jesse Holmes in Philadelphia).
87. See KAMMEN, supra note 15 (ascribing these views to Charles Beard, Vernon Par-
rington, Carl Becker, and J. Allen Smith).
88. See, e.g. David Prescott Barrows, The Constitution as an Element of Stability in
American Life, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 (May 1936); Walter F. Dodd,
The Powers of the National Government, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 65 (May
1936).
89. Charles Beard, The Living Constitution, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
29, 31 (May 1936).
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guous axioms from which the answer to every problem may be auto-
matically deduced.
From these two philosophies may be derived two sharply conflicting
conceptions of the Constitution. In the one view it is a charter meant to
endure for ages to come, and hence to be adapted to the circumstances
and the dominant purposes of each succeeding generation. In the other
view it is the enactment for all time of principles of fixed meaning and
universal validity.
90
Hart's characterizations of the "fundamentally different philoso-
phies" of constitutional interpretation were doubtless influenced by his
commitment to the "living Constitution" philosophy. But his characteri-
zations of the contrasting epistemological perspectives that informed each
of the philosophies were accurate. The traditionalist interpretive per-
spective on the Constitution was predicated on a view of the universe in
which humans could do little to alter the inevitable path of external
forces. From the universality of those forces, fixed principles of law and
government were deduced. Those principles were embodied in the Con-
stitution. The alternative "living Constitution" perspective emphasized
human choice as the dominant principle of causation in a "dynamic uni-
verse." If humans could choose the world in which they lived, they
could choose the constitutional principles by which they wanted to be
governed.
(2) The Demise of the Traditional Meaning of Adaptability on the Court: Police
Power Cases
The 1936 American Academy of Political and Social Science sympo-
sium revealed that contemporaries of the Blaisdell decision had seen it for
the fundamental interpretive conflict that it was. 9' But similar interpretive
conflicts were going on in other cases involving regulation of the econ-
omy in the 1930s. One example was the line of cases testing the appro-
priate reach of the police power against due process challenges, cases that
later came to be called "substantive due process" cases. 92
90. James Hart, A Unified Economy and States' Rights, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. ScI. 102, 102 (May 1936).
91. See supra notes 88-90.
92. This line of cases is a centerpiece of Barry Cushman's analysis in STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 107-38. Although my analysis
emphasizes different dimensions of the Court's police power/due process decisions in the 1920s
and 1930s, it builds upon Cushman's work. On the "discovery" of early twentieth century po-
lice power cases as "substantive due process" cases, see White, Revisiting Substantive Due Pro-
cess, supra note 67, which notes that the term "substantive due process" did not appear in any
federal case until 1942, and that commentators were still using the term "police power" for Ad-
kins-type cases in the early 1940s.
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Adkins v. Children's Hospital,93 decided in 1923, provides an op-
portunity to view the established discourse of late nineteenth century po-
lice powers jurisprudence still in place. Within these established catego-
ries, the Adkins case was familiar.' Congress had created a minimum
wage board for the District of Columbia and delegated it power to estab-
lish minimum wages for women and minors employed within the Dis-
trict.95 The constitutional challenge to the statute employed a series of
arguments characteristic of police powers due process cases: the statute
was said to have interfered with the "liberty" of employers and employ-
ees within the District to fix the terms of their employment contracts.95
Unlike a legitimate legislative use of police power, the law was not lim-
ited to businesses "affected with a public interest."'' It was not designed
to protect persons engaged in a particularly hazardous occupation. 98 It
was not an effort to prevent fraud in the payment of wages.' In short,
opponents argued that it did not come within the set of "exceptional cir-
cumstances"" ° in which the legislature could exercise its police power to
restrain freedom of contract.
In embracing those arguments, Sutherland's majority opinion placed
the statute under review in Adkins in one category rather than another.
Being an interference with "liberty of contract," and not having as its ra-
tionale one of the legitimate bases for exercise of the police powers, it
was thus "arbitrary" rather than "reasonable."' 0' In the opinion, Suther-
land took pains to emphasize that in reading the Due Process Clauses to
preclude broadly based minimum wage legislation the Court was not "ex-
ercis[ing]... a substantive power to review and nullify acts of Con-
93. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
94. For an analysis of Addns which appreciates it on its own terms, as a case testing the
categories of orthodox police powers jurisprudence, rather than as an anachronistically con-
ceived "substantive due process" case, see GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED, supra
note 67, at 167-74.
95. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 539-42.
96. Id. at 535.
97. Id. at 536.
98. Id.
99. Id. In McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 543, 552 (1909), the Court upheld a stat-
ute requiring coal operators to pay their employees based on the amount of "prescreened" coal
they had mined, rather than on the amount after it had been screened. An industrial commis-
sion created by Congress in 1898 to investigate working conditions in the coal mining industry
had identified the practice of employers of screening mined coal and basing wages on screened
amounts, noting that this had resulted in controversy between operators and miners. Id. at 549-
50. The Court in McLean concluded that the statute was analogous to those designed to prevent
fraud in business transactions and therefore was a legitimate exercise of the police power. Id.
at 550.
100. Id. at 546, 554.
101. Id. at 556-59.
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gress."' ° No such substantive power existed, Sutherland maintained.0 3
In reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, all judges were doing was
exercising the "power vested in courts to enable them to administer jus-
tice according to law. "l"M Judges had the authority "to ascertain and de-
termine the law in a given case."" ° It followed from that authority that if
"by clear and indubitable demonstration a statute be opposed to the Con-
stitution, we have no choice but to say so."" The judicial "duty" in
constitutional cases "to declare and enforce the rule of the supreme law
and reject that of an inferior act of legislation" was not a "substantive"
exercise."O7 It was "simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear
and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the
law. " 08
Sutherland's conception of the role of judges in constitutional adju-
dication was thus premised on two assumptions: that the "meaning" of
the Constitution was sufficiently finite and fixed and its principles were
easily ascertainable, and that judges "interpreting" the Constitution sim-
ply declared and enforced preexisting legal rules. Established police
powers jurisprudence was consistent with those assumptions. When a
statute infringed on entrenched "liberties," it only passed constitutional
muster if it was a reasonable exercise of the police power, and judges had
familiar guidelines to determine its constitutionality. The exercise was
sufficiently mechanical and the rules sufficiently clear to strip it of any
substantive dimensions.
Ignored in Sutherland's formulation, of course, was any sense that
the categories of police powers jurisprudence had themselves been cre-
ated by judges. The concepts of property "affected with a public inter-
est," and "liberty of contract" were not mentioned in the text of the Con-
stitution. They were devices to bridge the gap between open-ended
textual provisions such as "liberty" in the Due Process Clauses, loosely
defined legislative powers such as the police powers of the states, and
concrete legal controversies. However, they were not openly treated as
such in Sutherland's opinion in Adkins; they were treated as nearly the
equivalent of independent legal entities that a judge "declare[d]."1°9







109. Id. The words "openly" and "nearly" in this sentence are used advisedly. The inter-
pretive approach reflected in Sutherland's Addns opinion should neither be confused with tex-
tual "originalism" nor with a view that judicial interpretation was a process wholly lacking in
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For advocates of the "living Constitution" perspective, the catego-
ries of police powers jurisprudence appeared to be performing a function
quite different from that implicitly ascribed to them by Sutherland's Ad-
kins opinion. Sutherland's opinion had treated police power categories as
if they were finite legal rules to which a judge appealed in police power
cases. Interpretive critics of the opinion saw them as vessels into which
ideological content could be poured. In their view, police power doc-
trinal buzzwords--such as whether a business was "affected with a public
interest," or whether a statute allegedly infringing on some "liberty" had
a "public purpose"-could be seen as formulas through which groups of
judges expressed their conviction that it was either a good or a bad thing
for a particular business in question to be subject to hours or wages
regulation.
A comparison of Holmes's dissent11° with Sutherland's opinion in
Adkins reveals that Holmes was not merely abandoning the established
categories of police powers jurisprudence, he was abandoning the inter-
pretive role of the judge in political economy cases that accompanied
them. As noted, that role was predicated on the existence of a timeless
body of constitutional principles that restrained legislative activity. The
principles themselves were the product of assumptions about the structure
of republican government and the inevitability of certain external "laws"
in the universe, such as Sutherland's "law" that the forces of supply and
demand set wage levels and thus any governmental alteration of those
creativity. "Liberty of contract" was not a concept extracted from a literalist or originalist
reading of the constitutional text, but from what might be termed an originalist reading of the
Constitution's metaprinciples, including metaprinciples of political economy. Sutherland's ap-
proach presupposed that "liberty" in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments must necessarily
mean "liberty of contract" because of fundamental assumptions about private rights and gov-
ernmental obligations in the realm of political economy which he took to be assumptions em-
bodied in the Constitution. This approach also assumed that Supreme Court justices had a cer-
tain freedom (the flip side of their duty as interpreters in a constitutional republic) to decide
when "liberty of contract" trumped the police power and when it did not.
110. Id. at 567-71 (Holmes, J., dissenting). There was another dissent in Adkins, by Chief
Justice Taft, an opinion that Cushman rightfully identifies as an important landmark in the tran-
sition between the way a majority of the Court was conceptualizing police power cases in the
1920s and the way a different majority was conceptualizing those cases after 1937. See
CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at
195-96. Taft's opinion worked within the established doctrinal categories of police powers ju-
risprudence, and accepted the established role of judges as "pricking out" the "boundary" be-
tween private rights and the sphere of public governance in the realm of political economy.
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). However, Taft conceded that distinctions in
minimum wage/due process/police power cases derived more from the common sense of politi-
cal economy than from constitutional imperatives. Id. at 565 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). I have
omitted an extended treatment of Taft's dissent because the contrast between Sutherland's and
Holmes's interpretive postures is far more stark.
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levels worked an injustice to one of the parties in an employment con-
tract.1
11
Judges discerned and enforced this body of constitutional and meta-
constitutional principles.' It was their job to ensure that the sovereign
power of legislatures yielded to the transcendent sovereign power of the
Constitution where conflicts existed. Thus, in interpreting the term "lib-
erty" to include "liberty of contract," judges were simply declaring the
incontrovertible proposition that in a republican polity the private, con-
sensual arrangements of individuals were shielded from arbitrary legisla-
tive interference. The fact that the legislature represented "the people"
did not give it carte blanche to interfere with individual liberties because
the Constitution represented the people as well.
The approach Holmes took toward judicial review of legislation in
Adkins was premised on a radically different view of the roles of the leg-
islature and the judiciary in the American constitutional system. No-
where in Holmes's dissent was there a suggestion that "liberty of con-
tract" was a timeless principle of republican government. Instead, it was
a creation of judges - a "dogma" - the result of the Due Process
Clauses having "vague contours" that tempted judges to equate their own
ideological predilections with constitutional principles.' 3 That was inap-
propriate because legislators, not judges, were charged with the responsi-
bility of determining what was best for the public under the American
system of government. If legislatures decided that minimum wage levels
for women and children helped "remove conditions leading to ill health,
immorality and the deterioration of the race," it was not for judges to
second-guess them." 4
Because Holmes's dissent subsequently came to be seen as enlight-
ened wisdom by commentators,1 5 there has been a tendency to charac-
111. SeeAdlins, 261 U.S. at554.
112. At times, adherents of established police powers jurisprudence acted as if the princi-
ples were encompassed in textual provisions of the Constitution, such as "liberty" in the Due
Process Clauses, but at other times they treated the principles as endemic to the nature of re-
publican government. The principle that a legislature could not take property from A and give
it to B, for example, could be seen either as embodied in the Due Process Clauses or simply as
foundational to a republican state and thus necessarily part of the structure of the Constitution.
113. Id. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 567 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
115. Holmes's most vocal and arguably influential acolyte in the late 1920s and 1930s was
Felix Frankfurter, but there were others. See Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the
Constitution: A Review of his Twenty-Five Years on the Supreme Court, 41 HARV. L. REV. 121
(1927); FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1938). For
an effort to associate Holmes's interpretive posture in cases such as Adkins with the Realist
movement of the 1930s, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Holmes, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 485 (1935).
Llewellyn's orientation in that essay was more toward general jurisprudence rather than consti-
tutional interpretation, but it was entirely consistent with the "living Constitution" rubric. See
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terize decisions such as Adkins as otherworldly efforts by an isolated, re-
actionary Court. But orthodox police powers jurisprudence persisted
well beyond Adkins; it was the analytical mode employed by the decision
that overruled Adkins fourteen years later, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.16
The Parrish case has conventionally been identified as the case that ush-
ered in the "constitutional revolution," demonstrating either the Court's
embarrassing capitulation to political pressures or its sensible accommo-
dation to the modem world, depending on the commentator's point of
view.117 However, a glance at the opinions in the case reveals the catego-
ries of orthodox police powers jurisprudence still intact.
Parrish tested the constitutionality of a Washington statute prescrib-
ing minimum wage levels for women and minors working in industries or
occupations within the state. 8 A custodian, Elsie Parrish, brought suit
against her employer, a hotel, to recover the difference between her ac-
tual wages and the minimum fixed by the state that she should have re-
ceived. 19 She was awarded the amount of her claim and the hotel ap-
pealed, citing Adkins and invoking the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.'2
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes began his opinion for the Court
by noting that Parrish was a typical police power due process case, pit-
id. at 487-88.
116. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 225-38. Cushman argues that a police power/due
process case the Court decided between Adkins and Parrish, Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934), provides a hitherto underemphasized key to the "constitutional revolution" itself. I
agree with Cushman that the Nebbia decision's blurring of the "public/private" distinction on
which traditional police powers jurisprudence was founded, reflected in the buzzwords "affected
with a public interest," was a crucial factor in delegitimating the entire structure of doctrinal
categories on which that traditional jurisprudence rested. However, no opinion in Nebbia
matches those in either Adkins or Parrish in advancing fully developed statements of the con-
trasting interpretive positions I am analyzing in this Article.
117. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish is characterized by William Leuchtenburg as "triggering a
constitutional revolution." LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 163. Leuchtenburg seems unable
to restrain his enthusiasm for Elsie Parrish, the "chambermaid" petitioner in Parrish, saying
that she had "accomplished something of historic significance ... for the thousands of women
scrubbing floors in hotels.., who needed to know... that they could summon the law to
their side," but is far less enthusiastic about the Court that supposedly "switched" its constitu-
tional jurisprudence in 1937, suggesting at one point that the Court's "performance... proved
especially embarrassing" to its own Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes. Id. at 177, 179.
For a recognition of the survival of orthodox police powers jurisprudence in Suther-
land's opinion in Parrish, see GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED, supra note 67, at 192-
93. I disagree with Gillman's claim that with the Parrish decision "[n]ew social facts had fi-
nally brought down a century-old police powers jurisprudence," id. at 193, unless by "new so-
cial facts" Gillman is willing to include new epistemological attitudes, which would seem to
strain the ordinary meaning of "facts."
118. 300 U.S. at 386-87.




ting liberty against the "power... to restrict freedom of contract... in
the public interest."21 He then traced a variety of cases in which statutes
had restricted liberty because the business in question was "affected with
a public interest" or because "health and safety, . . . peace and good or-
der may be promoted through regulations designed to insure wholesome
conditions of work and freedom from oppression."" By the last phrase
Hughes meant regulations striking at unequal bargaining power, in con-
texts where "proprietors lay down the rules and the laborers are practi-
cally constrained to obey them. " 1 In such circumstances, Hughes
maintained, "self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and the legislature
may properly interpose its authority."2
Hughes argued that legislative intervention was particularly applica-
ble to the employment of women in order to correct inequalities in wages
brought about by inequalities in bargaining power."8 Citing Muller v.
Oregon 6 and other cases where the Court had permitted states to give
special protection to female workers, Hughes noted that those cases "em-
phasized the need of protecting women against oppression despite her
possession of contractual rights." 27 He quoted Muller to the effect that
"there is that in [a woman's] disposition and habits of life which will op-
erate against a full assertion of those rights," and concluded that "some
legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of
right."128
Moreover, according to Hughes, there were other public benefits in
legislation placing women in an advantaged position. Because of "the
performance of maternal functions," the physical well-being of women
was "an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race." 2 9 Thus, minimum wage legislation,
which was designed in part to p'revent women from having to work long
hours to earn a sufficient wage, was "not imposed solely for her benefit,
but also largely for the benefit of all. "13
This "array of precedents and the principles they applied" was
thought by Hughes to be sufficient to sustain the Washington statute de-
spite Adkins.' However, he was prepared to go further and overrule
121. Id. at 392.
122. Id. at 393.
123. Id. at 394.
124. Id. at 394.
125. Id.
126. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
127. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 394.
128. Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 394 (citations omitted).




Adkins altogether. He argued that the distinction fashioned by Sutherland
in Adkins between maximum hours legislation and minimum wage legis-
lation could not stand.132 Limitations on either hours or wages affected
freedom of contract in its absolute sense, as Taft had pointed out in Ad-
kins."' In neither instance was the state compelling an employer to meet
the terms of the legislation; if the employer's business could not meet the
burden, it would employ fewer workers. 4 Both situations would simply
result in fewer profits "wrung from the necessities of .... employees,"
which would benefit the community at large.1 35
Hughes's analysis was primarily conducted within the conventional
terms of police powers jurisprudence. However, there were two signals
in Parrish that a majority of the Court was in the process of recasting the
methodology of constitutional interpretation in such cases. Both signals
were noted by Sutherland, writing for the four dissenters in Parrish, and
Sutherland took the signals to be ominous developments.136
The first signal was Hughes's articulation of the standard of review
in Due Process Clause cases. Rather than speaking of "liberty of con-
tract" in such cases as being "absolute and uncontrollable," Hughes de-
fined it as "liberty in a social organization," having "its history and con-
notation," and being "necessarily subject to the restraints of due
process."137 He then defined regulation that would conform to constitu-
tional Due Process standards as "regulation which is reasonable in rela-
tion to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community."13
This standard of review meant, of course, that "liberty of contract"
had ceased to be a fixed principle of republican government and become
a phrase with "its [own] history and connotation," subject to the exigen-
cies of changing political and economic conditions. This new contextual
definition of "liberties" in Due Process Clause cases suggested that the
judiciary was prepared to become a more passive actor in such cases.
Abandoning fixed principles of constitutional analysis in police powers
jurisprudence meant that police powers cases would henceforth have no
bright line categories such as "affected with a public interest." In such
an analytical realm it was unlikely that many legislative judgments about
the appropriate scope of regulatory legislation would be second-guessed.
Although this signal surely spelled the end of Adkins, it was proba-
bly less provocative to Sutherland and the other dissenters in Parrish than
the second of Hughes's signals in Parrish, which was directed at the ex-
132. Id.
133. Id. at 395-96.
134. ,Id. at 396-97.
135. Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
136. See id. at 400-14 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).




ternal context of constitutional interpretation. In suggesting that Adkins
did not definitively resolve the question in Parrish, Hughes pointed out
some factors that "demand[ ] on our part a reexamination of the Adkins
case."139 He included among those factors "the economic conditions
which have supervened, and in the light of which the reasonableness of
the exercise of the protective power of the State must be considered,
[which] make it not only appropriate, but we think imperative, that in de-
ciding the present case the subject should receive fresh consideration.""
Later in his opinion, Hughes referred to "the unparalleled demands for
relief which arose during the recent period of depression and still con-
tinue to an alarming extent."141 Depressed economic conditions had ac-
centuated the plight of "a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power."14 Their vulnerability was "not only
detrimental to their health and well being but cast[ ] a direct burden for
their support upon the community."43
The clear import of these comments was that the meaning of consti-
tutional principles was affected by the current social context. The princi-
ple of protection for "liberty of contract" presupposed that bargaining
power was simply a function of the marketplace, so that "inequalities"
were endemic and could not be redressed by legislative intervention.
Hughes was suggesting that when inequalities in bargaining power were
accentuated by an already depressed economy, the liberty of contract
principle should not stand in the way of legislative relief. His analysis
also assumed that the burdens imposed on workers by their lack of bar-
gaining power were burdens that the rest of society would eventually as-
sume: "What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon
to pay."" Thus, the invocation of the liberty of contract principle under
such conditions was inefficacious. According to Hughes, the problem
with the prevailing "connotation" of liberty of contract was that it stood
in the way of some necessary paternalistic legislation.
It is not clear whether Hughes, in referring to "fresh consideration"
of a portion of the constitutional text in light of "economic conditions
which have supervened" since its framing, 45 was asserting the Marshal-
lian version of adaptivity or its modem counterpart. Sutherland, how-
ever, thought he understood which of those versions Hughes was ad-
vancing:
139. Id. at 390.
140. Id.




145. Id. at 390.
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It is urged that the question involved should now receive fresh consid-
eration, among other reasons, because of "the economic conditions
which have supervened"; but the meaning of the Constitution does not
change with the ebb and flow of economic events. We frequently are
told in more general words that the Constitution must be construed in
the light of the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is
made up of living words that apply to every new condition which they
include, the statement is quite true. But to say, if that be intended, that
the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when
written-that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they
would have applied then-is to rob that instrument of the essential ele-
ment which continues it in force as the people have made it until they,
and not their official agents, have made it otherwise.
146
It.may be difficult for contemporary readers to grasp the distinction
Sutherland sought to draw. That distinction was between fixed principles
as "intelligently and reasonably construed" by judges, 147 and the applica-
tion of those principles to changing conditions. When novel features in
American civilization precipitated the creation of new legal issues, judges
were to resolve those issues by the application of principles that were al-
ready in existence. As Sutherland put it, "[w]hat a court is to do... is
to declare the law as written, leaving it to the people themselves to make
such changes as new circumstances may require. According to this
viewpoint, the meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted and
it is not different at any subsequent time. "148 Sutherland had stated the
traditional meaning of adaptivity in constitutional interpretation.
Traditional police powers analysis furnished an opportunity to put
Suilterland's theory of constitutional interpretation into practice. That
analysis pitted legislation justified under traditional police powers against
constitutional challenges based on "liberty of contract." The police
power of the federal government and the states was not explicitly men-
tioned in the Constitution, except perhaps obliquely in the General Wel-
fare Clause, 149 but "everyone" knew that the power to promote the
health, safety and morals of the people was fundamental to republican
government. Similarly, "liberty" was mentioned in both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and "everyone" knew, at least after the 1880s,
that "liberty" included the freedom to enter into contracts and to set the
terms of those contracts. So the "meaning" of the Constitution was
fixed, both with respect to the sanctity of liberty in the Due Process
Clauses and with respect to the legitimacy of the police power. The
meaning of the Constitution did not change in its applications; the process
146. Id. at 402-03 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 404 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
only confirmed that "the Constitution is made up of living words that ap-
ply to every new condition which they include." 5
Thus the minimum wage cases could be seen*as pitting two irrecon-
cilable conceptions of constitutional interpretation against one another.
Under Sutherland's conception, the fixed meaning of the Constitution was
that minimum wage legislation violated the first principles of republican
government by taking property from A and giving it to B. It also violated
the "liberty" of all citizens to set the terms of their own employment
without interference from the state. Although the state could sometimes
interfere with contractual relations, those instances were limited to cases
in which all members of the citizenry were implicated in the health,
safety, or welfare features of a contract. Contracts involving women la-
borers were not examples of such cases, simply by virtue of the sex of
those laborers. Thus, the Court had a "duty" to invalidate minimum
wage legislation. As Sutherland put it:
The suggestion that the only check upon the exercise of the judicial
power ... is the judge's own faculty of self-restraint, is both ill consid-
ered and mischievous. Self-restraint belongs in the domain of will and
not of judgment. The check upon the judge is that imposed by ... the
Constitution ;J he has the duty to make up his own mind and adjudge
accordingly.
Under the conception of constitutional interpretation employed by
Hughes in Parrish, the meaning of "liberty" in the Due Process Clauses
and the scope of the police power in minimum wage cases was a function
of circumstance. If a depression in the wages for female workers in ho-
tels meant that they were in danger of failing to earn a living wage and of
becoming candidates for poverty relief, the state could step in to guaran-
tee them a living wage and keep them from becoming burdens on the rest
of the citizenry. There was, then, no fixed principle that the state could
not interfere with "liberty of contract"; whether or not the state could in-
terfere depended on the consequences of its noninterference. The mean-
ing of the Constitution could not be divorced from the context in which
its provisions were interpreted. Constitutional adaptivity had itself taken
on a new meaning. 52
150. Id. at 402-03 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 402 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
152. One could argue, as Cushman has, that the new meaning of adaptivity had its first im-
portant statement in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), handed down three years before
Parrish. See CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10,
manuscript at 252-62. The date of Nebbia is important for Cushman because it is part of his
argument that the jurisprudence of the "constitutional revolution" in political economy cases
was established well before the 1936 election and the early 1937 introduction of the Court-
packing plan. As noted, I do not find Nebbia to be as significant an interpretive exemplar as
Parrish. See supra note 116. Perhaps that can be explained simply by the comparative rhetori-
cal skills of Hughes and Roberts. For further development of this point, see WHITE,
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11. The Triumph of the New Meaning of Adaptivity: Wickard v.
Filburnt
As of this writing, Parrish marked the last time in the twentieth
century when the Court has employed the traditional nineteenth century
categories of police power jurisprudence in a due process challenge to
paternalistic state legislation in the realm of political economy. As an
interpretive milestone, I have suggested that its message was ambiguous.
However, there was a case in the period conventionally described as en-
compassing the "constitutional revolution"-the period from 1937 to the
end of the Second World War-which clearly signified that an interpre-
tive revolution was established in the realm of political economy. The
case was not a due process case but a Commerce Clause case, Wickard v.
Filburn.
Another contribution of revisionist constitutional history since the
1970s has been the demonstration of an innate complexity in the method-
ology of late nineteenth and early twentieth century constitutional juris-
prudence. That complexity may be stated as follows: Late nineteenth
and early twentieth century judges and jurists thought in categorical terms
about constitutional issues. Their categories were not only composed of
different areas of constitutional law (Contracts Clause issues versus Tak-
ings Clause issues versus Due Process Clauses issues), but of different
spheres of the realm of political economy ("public" versus "private").
Notwithstanding this "categorical" mindset, late nineteenth and early
twentieth century judges and jurists were prone to what might be called
"doctrinal radiation," a process by which an interpretive approach to one
area of constitutional law (e.g., the Due Process Clauses) radiated into
another (e.g., the Contracts Clause). 54
It would be too much to call this complexity a paradox, because the
doctrinal radiations that flowed from one area of the constitutional law of
political economy between the 1870s and 1930s did not overwhelm juris-
tic categorization. However, they can be said to have had an important
intuitive effect. As some members of the Court began to rethink their
approach to police power/due process issues in the 1920s and 1930s, that
intellectual process can be shown to have had an impact on their approach
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 22, at 211.
153. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
154. Compare MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 16-19 (1992) with Charles McCurdy, Justice Field
and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Paramerters of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIsT. 970 (1975) and CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 131-34.
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to other issues in the realm of political economy, such as Commerce
Clause issues. 55
In the period between the 1920s and the early 1940s, Commerce
Clause jurisprudence underwent a transformation roughly parallel to that
of police powers jurisprudence, with doctrinal concepts such as the "cur-
rent" or "stream" of commerce and doctrinal formulas such as the dis-
tinction between the "direct" and "indirect" effects of an activity on in-
terstate commerce becoming increasingly more pliable and less easy to
maintain. Finally, in the 1941 case of United States v. Darby Lumber
Co., '56 the "stream of commerce" doctrine was overwhelmed by a raging
river: the sphere of federal regulation in the realm of political economy
became much more intrusive.'57 And a year after Darby the Court went
even further, implicitly abandoning the "direct"/"indirect" distinction and
all other legal distinctions in Commerce Clause jurisprudence and con-
cluding that Congress could regulate whenever it had a plausible eco-
nomic reason for thinking that regulation of a particular industry had
some substantial positive effects on interstate commerce. 158 The remark-
able feature of that case, Wickard v. Filburn, was that the Court virtually
admitted that in the future, Commerce Clause questions were to be seen
essentially as "living Constitution" questions: questions that asked to
what extent the meaning of the Constitution could be altered by judges to
make it responsive to the exigencies of a modem economy.
Wickard v. Filburn was initially a troublesome case for the justices
because they could not see any connection between the activities of
Roscoe Filburn and interstate commerce. Filbum was an Ohio fanner
155. Tracing doctrinal radiations is an important goal of Cushman's project. See, e.g.,
Cushman, Stream of Legal Consciousness, supra note 12, at 108; Cushman, Doctrinal Synergies
andLiberal Dilemmas, supra note 12, at 238.
156. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). In Darby, a unanimous court treated the wages of workers in a
lumber yard in Georgia as coming within the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938's prohibition
against wages below a certain amount for industries engaged in "production for interstate com-
merce." Hitherto, wages in industries engaged in "manufacturing," as distinguished from
'commerce," had been exempt from federal requirements.
157. This reading of the case is strengthened by the fact that Hughes, whose opinion in the
earlier case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), had retained the
traditional distinctions of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, only grudgingly joined Stone's
Darby opinion. He first declined to vote to sustain the Fair Labor Standards Act, eventually
only "going along" with Stone's opinion when it became clear that there would be no dissent-
ers. See Conference Notes, William 0. Dquglas Papers, Library of Congress; Conference
Notes, Frank Murphy Papers, University of Michigan Library, quoted in CUSHMAN,
STRUCTURE OFA CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 580-81. In the
justices' conference on Darby, Hughes said that Fair Labor Standards Act "reaches into the
field of production" and as such threatens to put "our dual system of government ... at an
end." Id. He remained skeptical as to whether Congressional regulation of the hours and
wages of workers in a local lumberyard was justified by the commerce power. See id.
158. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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who was required by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 to plant
only a limited allotment of wheat.'59 He planted twice as much as that
allotment, however, and having shipped his allotted wheat to market, re-
tained the rest for use and consumption on his farm." ° He was assessed
a penalty by Ohio county and state Conservation Committees that had
been established by the Act, and he sued to enjoin enforcement of that
penalty.161 In the process, he challenged the wheat marketing 'provisions
of the Act as unconstitutional. 16 2
As noted, Wickard v. Filburn came at a time when the Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence appeared to be poised to abandon the
categorical formulas of the early twentieth century. However, it was not
clear what the Court was prepared to put in their place. Because the
wheat for which Filburn was penalized had neither been produced for nor
shipped in interstate commerce, and yet Congress had sought to regulate
its use in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the case appeared to
pose three options for the Justices. One was to employ traditional for-
mulas and declare the Act unconstitutional as applied to the private con-
sumption of wheat. Under this reasoning, wheat produced for private
consumption was not "in commerce," or in "interstate commerce," and
its effect on interstate commerce was not "direct." After Darby it was
patently clear that the Court would not exercise that option. 63
The second possibility was to declare that the production of wheat
for home use had a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce, following
language employed by Stone in Darby."6 This option would have pre-
served some (although not much) continuity with prior Court cases, and
would have retained some judicial power to make independent determi-
nations of the connection between Congressional regulation of a particu-
lar economic activity and interstate commerce. Despite the advantages of
that option, it posed one major difficulty for the Court: it was hard to see
how one farmer's decision to produce more wheat for his own consump-
tion had any effect on interstate commerce, let alone a substantial one. If
all farmers acted as Filburn had, then the farming community would
cease to become prospective buyers of each other's wheat, but there was
no evidence that other farmers were inclined to follow Filburn's example.
The third option was for the Court to treat Congress's decision to
establish marketing quotas in the Agricultural Adjustment Act as evidence
that Congress believed that the production of wheat for home use would
159. Id. at 113-16.
160. Id. at 114.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 156.
164. Darby, 312 U.S. at 119.
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have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. According to this line
of reasoning, in establishing the quotas Congress apparently believed that
if enough farmers produced wheat for their own consumption the demand
for wheat in interstate commerce would be reduced, and this would have
a negative effect on the price of interstate wheat. A principal purpose of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act had been to help depressed industries,
such as the wheat industry, by supporting the prices of goods from those
industries. Thus, one could conclude that Congress believed there was a
substantial connection between supporting the price structure of the wheat
industry and establishing federal marketing quotas for the production of
wheat for home consumption. If the Court found that belief reasonable,
it could sustain the legislation as an appropriate exercise of the commerce
power.
Wickard v. Filburn was first argued before the Court in May,
1942.1" After that argument, it was clear that though the justices be-
lieved that the marketing quotas amounted to a "regulation of com-
merce," they were hard-pressed to find that the application of the quotas
to Filbum amounted to an actual regulation of interstate commerce or a
regulation of an activity that had a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. Thus, penalizing Filbum for growing wheat for his own con-
sumption seemed unconstitutional under any formula currently in use in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, including that adopted by the Court in
Darby.
However, the Court did not generate an opinion with that conclu-
sion. Instead, it discussed how more facts might be obtained to buttress a
finding that the regulation of wheat for home consumption had a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce. An early draft of an opinion by Jus-
tice Robert Jackson favored remanding the case to a lower court to de-
termine whether that substantial effect existed." As Jackson stated in
that draft, "Congress may not act by its will alone, for it was not given to
one of the parties to the federal compact to expand its own functions at
will .... [I]t is the function of the courts to determine whether the par-
ticular activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach of federal
power. 167 That passage presupposed the traditional role for the Court of
policing the boundaries of governmental power and private authority,
whether in connection with the Commerce Clause or the Due Process
Clauses.
165. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111.
166. Jackson's draft opinion is discussed in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 590-91.
167. Opinion draft, Wickard v. Filburn, May 22, 1942, at 10, 12, in ROBERT JACKSON
PAPERS (available in the Library of Congress), quoted in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 590-91.
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But it became apparent that some justices on the Court were less in-
terested in the details of the relationship between the production of wheat
for home consumption and interstate commerce than they were in the
question whether the Court should continue its traditional role in Com-
merce Clause cases. An analogy to the Court's Due Process Clause ju-
risprudence seemed to have surfaced. As the Due Process Clause cases
moved into the 1930s, the twin pillars of categorist methodology-that
there were bright lines between the public and private spheres of the
realm of political economy and that judges fashioned and policed those
lines-began to crumble. Eventually the public/private distinction be-
came obliterated, and Parrish replaced judicial policing with judicial def-
erence to the minimal rationality of legislatures. In Wickard v. Filburn,
the justices appeared to be groping toward similar postures.
After Jackson's original opinion in Wickard v. Filburn was with-
drawn, and a majority of the Court voted to have the case reargued the
next term, Jackson exchanged letters with some other justices and his law
clerk."1 In those letters he articulated his growing conviction that draw-
ing lines in Commerce Clause cases was no easier than in Due Process
Clause cases. Just as there was no easily cabinable category of business
affected with a public interest, 161 there was no easily cabinable definition
of activities that were "intrastate" in character, bearing no relationship to
interstate commerce. Thus, the questions in Commerce Clause cases
were not legalistic ones, but economic ones. "In such a state of affairs,"
Jackson wrote to his law clerk in July 1942, "the determination of the
limit of [Congress's power under the Commerce Clause] is not a matter
of legal principle, but of personal opinion; not one of constitutional law,
but one of economic policy."170
In memoranda on Wickard v. Filburn in the summer of 1942, little
by little, Jackson worked himself around to the position that "that is
within the commerce power which Congress desires to regulate. " 1 The
facts of Wickard v. Filburn made it clear that if the Court sustained the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as applied to Filburn, "I don't see
how we can ever sustain states' rights again as against a Congressional
168. These have also been preserved in the Robert Jackson Papers. See CUSHMAN,
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 592-616.
169. A majority of the Court had committed itself to that proposition in Nebbia, but as late
as the early 1940s it was still not clear whether the implications of that commitment had fully
been grasped.
170. Robert Jackson, Memorandum for Mr. Costelloe, Re: Wickard Case (July 10, 1942),
at 15, in ROBERT JACKSON PAPERS, (available in the Library of Congress) [hereinafter July 10
Memorandum], quoted in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra
note 10, manuscript at 603.
171. July 10 Memorandum, supra note 170, at 16, quoted in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 604.
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exercise of the commerce power." 1" Instead of using this conclusion as
a basis for resurrecting the categories of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
and invalidating the Act, Jackson began to think of using it as a basis for
"introduc[ing] ... economic determinism into the constitutional law of
interstate commerce" and initiating "the end of judicial control of the
scope of federal activity." 73 He was moving toward "[a] frank holding
that the interstate commerce power has no limits except those which
Congress sees fit to observe."1 74
In July 1942, Jackson outlined to his law clerk the basis of an opin-
ion sustaining the application of the Act to Filburn. He wrote:
Congress has seen fit to regulate small and casual wheat growers in the
interest of large and specialized ones .... Whether this is necessary,
whether it is just, whether it is wise, is not for us to say .... [W]e
have no legal standards by which to set our judgment against the policy
judgment of Congress .... [The regulation of wheat grown for home
consumption] is within the federal power to regulate interstate com-
merce, if for no better reason than the commerce clause is what the
Congress says it is. 175
The law clerk, stunned by the implications of Jackson's position, asked:
[Are] all the old formulae and tests junked .... Is the Court never to
seek to preserve our 'dual system of government' by denying that the
Commerce Power can reach to 'effects upon interstate commerce so in-
direct and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex soci-
ety, would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is national
and what is local and create a completely centralized government?'176
Jackson's response was that "in order to be unconstitutional. . . the rela-
tion between interstate commerce and the regulated activity would have to
be so absurd that it would be laughed out of Congress."'"
In October 1942, the Wickard case was reargued, and in November
of that year the Court handed down a unanimous opinion, authored by
Jackson.17 In sustaining the Agricultural Adjustment Act penalty against
172. Robert Jackson, Memorandum for Mr. Costelloe, Re: Wickard case (June 19, 1942),
at 5, in ROBERT JACKSON PAPERS, (available in Library of Congress) [hereinafter June 19
Memorandum], quoted in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, Supra
note 10, manuscript at 604.
173. June 19 Memorandum, supra note 172, at 6, quoted in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 604-05.
174. Id.
175. July 10 Memorandum, supra note 170, at 22, quoted in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 606-07.
176. Robert Jackson, Memorandum AAA, at 1, in JACKSON PAPERS, (available in Library
of Congress), quoted in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra
note 10, manuscript at 607.
177. June 19 Memorandum, supra note 172, at 6,- quoted in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, supra note 10, manuscript at 605.
178. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113.
July 1997]
Filburn, Jackson announced that "questions of the power of Congress
[under the Commerce Clause] are not to be decided by reference to any
formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as
'production' and 'indirect. "'79 Such questions should focus on "the ac-
tual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce." '' 80 To
clarify any doubts about the turn in the Court's Commerce Clause juris-
prudence, he went on:
The Court's recognition of the relevance of the economic effects in the
application of the Commerce Clause.. . has made the mechanical ap-
plication of legal formulas no longer feasible ....
[E]ven if [an] activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time
have been defined as "direct" or "indirect. 18'
Jackson's opinion also made it plain that the "substantiality" of the
effect of an activity on interstate commerce was not a matter for the
Court to decide. He said of the Wickard case, "[t]his record leaves us in
no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat con-
sumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regula-
tion, would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its pur-
pose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices. "182 And that was all
that was necessary to sustain the statute:
The conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and those who
advantage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by the
Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process.
Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination. And
with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation we
have nothing to do. 183
It seems fair to say that despite doctrinal radiations, Wickard v. Fil-
burn was not a Commerce Clause analog to Parrish. Parrish had re-
tained the categories of police powers/Due Process Clause jurisprudence,
even though undermining them, and had appeared to anticipate a contin-
ued role for the Court as a scrutinizer of legislative interference with em-
ployment relationships, even though wages or hours legislation has never
been invalidated since the decision came down. Wickard, however,
completely destroyed the edifice of traditional Commerce Clause juris-
prudence.
179. Id. at 120.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 123-25.
182. Id. at 128-29.
183. Id. at 129.
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Jackson's opinion explicitly stated that the reach of the commerce
power would be determined by "economic effects" rather than "legal
formulas. " " At the same time it announced that "[t]he conflicts of eco-.
nomic interest" that might precipitate Congressional regulation of busi-
ness activities were not subjects of judicial inquiry. 85 The role of the
courts to police the boundary between the "national" and "local" spheres
of the realm of political economy had been abandoned. An interpretive
revolution had taken place. The "living Constitution" rubric had been
internalized by the Court.
I. Adaptivity, The Constitutional Revolution, and the
Triumph of Modernist Consciousness
How could the Court write an opinion such as Wickard, handed
down only five years after Sutherland's dissent in Parrish? A conven-
tional explanation of the "constitutional revolution" of the late 1930s and
1940s associates that "revolution" with the dramatic triumph of Roosevelt
in the election of 1936, the introduction of the "Court-packing" plan in
early 1937, and the allegedly politically-motivated "switch" of the Court
that resulted in the overruling of Adkins and the sanctioning of minimum
wage and maximum hours legislation. 16
However, we can take for granted that the conventional explanation
has been largely discredited.' 87 In some versions, it violates elementary
principles of causation: the Court's "switch" in the minimum wage cases
took place before the Court-packing plan was introduced, and the most
significant changes in the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence took
place after the Court-packing plan had failed. In addition, the explana-
tion pays insufficient attention to the persistence of traditional, categorical
modes of analysis in both the Court's Due Process and Commerce Clause
cases throughout the 1930s. At the same time, the conventional explana-
tion pays insufficient attention to the shift in the nature of constitutional
interpretation heralded by decisions such as Blaisdell, handed down three
years before the Court-packing plan.
Thus the challenge is to advance an explanation for the constitutional
"revolution" that abandons the Court-packing crisis as a causative ele-
ment. The place to start such an explanation is with a recapitulation of
184. Id. at 123-24.
185. Id. at 129.
186. See sources cited supra note 12.
187. See Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, supra note 10, and citations therein;
Friedman, supra note 12; Eben Moglen, Toward a New Deal Legal History, 80 VA. L. REv.
263 (1994); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 VA. L. REV. 277
(1994).
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the Court's traditional constitutional jurisprudence in cases involving
government regulation of the economy.188 Building on that recapitulation,
this Article has drawn a connection between the structure of the Court's
traditional constitutional jurisprudence in the realm of political economy
and the established nineteenth and early twentieth century interpretive
role for Supreme Court justices in constitutional interpretation. That role
presupposed the existence of preordained boundaries in the political
economy realm and identified the justices as interpretive creators and
guardians of those boundaries. Despite an ascribed judicial function of
"pricking out" boundary lines, the role did not equate constitutional in-
terpretation with "lawmaking" in the modem sense of that term.
Crucial to the juristic integrity of the system of orthodox constitu-
tional jurisprudence was the traditional assumption of American republi-
can thought that a "government of laws" was distinct from a "govern-
ment of men," so that in policing the boundary between spheres, the
judiciary was merely articulating and applying preexisting first principles
of republican government. The traditional method of constitutional inter-
pretation, set forth by Sutherland in his dissents in Blaisdell and Parrish,
was based on that assumption. 189 The meaning of the Constitution did not
fundamenfally change with time, despite the application of constitutional
principles to new cases, because the principles of republican government
embedded in the Constitution were external to those who interpreted
them. New conditions might produce new applications, but not new
principles. If the principles of the Constitution compelled a politically or
economically disadvantageous result, as in Blaisdell, the only remedy
was to amend the Constitution. Adaptivity, in the world of constitutional
interpretation, had a specialized, Marshallian meaning.
The emergence of the "living Constitution" theory of constitutional
interpretation in the 1920s and 1930s was a signal that the set of episte-
mological assumptions that gave traditional constitutional jurisprudence
its integrity was beginning to lose its status as an orthodoxy. The debate
between constitutional theorists such as Beck on the one hand, and
McBain or Corwin on the other, demonstrated that the premises of ortho-
dox constitutionalism had been exposed and challenged."9 "Back to the
Constitution" meant a reaffirmation of those premises; the "living Con-
stitution" model of interpretation was an effort to reveal their obsoles-
cence.
The epistemological issue at the center of the debate over constitu-
tional adaptivity was the locus of causation in the universe. The tradi-
188. A recapitulation advanced in detail in CUSHMAN, STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION, supra note 10.
189. See supra notes 75-76, 147-49, and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part I.B.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL ('Vol. 48
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
tional theory of constitutional interpretation had been founded on a view
of causation that attributed primary significance to forces external to hu-
man conduct. "Law" was taken to be one of those forces, at least in
America, because it was conceived as a collection of principles that were
prepolitical and essentialist, subject only to revision by "the people" at
large. The essentialist principles of law included ones derived from the
recognition of other omnipotent causal forces in the universe: the pub-
lic/private distinction in the constitutional law of political economy, for
example, was itself a product of the assumed incapacity of government to
have any significant effect on the iron laws of economics.1 9'
The emergence of the "living Constitution" theory of interpretation
and the ultimate displacement of the orthodox view of adaptivity followed
from the replacement of an epistemology of externally based causation
with one that stressed the primacy of human will as a causal agent in the
universe. A recognition of the capacity of humans to change their envi-
ronment, to control their destiny, and to affect their future meant that
purportedly essentialist legal principles, predicated on the inexorability of
external forces, were not essentialist after all; they could be refashioned.
Law could be "made" by humans; a government with laws could none-
theless be one of men.'92
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, traditionalist con-
stitutional jurisprudence remained in place with its integrated system of
principles, doctrines, and distinctions. However, as new cases continued
to place pressure on the system to "adapt," doctrines and distinctions be-
came increasingly elaborated and refined to the point of appearing ar-
cane. Meanwhile, critics such as Holmes began to attack doctrines such
as "liberty of contract" or "business affected with a public interest" as
judge-made rather than essentialist."9  Of course, Holmes's critique was
predicated on a modernist view of causal attribution in the universe; it
also treated judicial lawmaking as both inevitable and dangerous in a con-
stitutional democracy."
191. The above paragraph is a summary of arguments I have made elsewhere. See, e.g.,
White, Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis, supra note 19, at 580-85; White, First Amend-
ment Comes of Age, supra note 18, at 311-27. For an earlier version of those arguments, see
G. Edward White, Recapturing New Deal Lawyers, 102 HARv. L. REv. 489, 489-91 (1988)
(book review).
192. By the 1930s, possibly even women: Frances Perkins joined the Roosevelt Admini-
stration as Secretary of Labor.
193. In addition to Holmes' Adkins dissent, see supra note 110, another example of this
criticism can be found in his dissent to Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927),
where he called the doctrine that a business was affected with a public interest "little more than
a fiction intended to beautify what is disagreeable to the sufferers."
194. A dimension of the change in consciousness I am labeling modernist that will not re-
ceive extended discussion in this article is the shift from a republicanist to a democratist gov-
erning theory of American constitutionalism. Holmes simultaneously embraced both theories:
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Through the 1930s, traditionalist constitutional jurisprudence contin-
ued to dominate the Supreme Court's approach to cases involving gov-
ernment and the economy, but adaptive pressure eventually resulted in
substantial modification of standard traditionalist formulas and even some
flirtations with a "living Constitution" approach to interpretation.195
Then, suddenly, a newly composed Court jettisoned the formulas alto-
gether, fully embraced Holmes's critique, and changed the meaning of
adaptivity in constitutional interpretation. The central questions in Com-
merce Clause cases for this new Court majority were no longer whether a
case fell within or without some formulaic distinction, such as "di-
rect"/"indirect." They were whether an activity had some substantive
economic effect on interstate commerce, and whether the judiciary should
interfere with Congressional regulation of that activity if it did. After
Wickard, the Court concluded that it would let Congress decide the first
question, thereby resolving the second as well. It was adapting the Con-
stitution in a radically different sense. 196
In cases involving the realm of political economy, the dangers of
constitutional interpretation were thus radically relocated after Wickard.
In traditionalist constitutional jurisprudence, the dangers were that the ju-
diciary would not police the public/private boundary sufficiently, thereby
allowing legislatures to undermine fundamental principles of republican
government. After Wickard, the dangers were that the judiciary would
substitute one form of lawmaking instituted by judges in the guise of con-
stitutional interpretation for another instituted by legislatures. In a world
in which human-based causation dominated, lawmaking by judges raised
problems of legitimacy in a democratic society. In a world dominated by
external causation, judicial lawmaking was a contradiction in terms, and
legislative lawmaking often raised problems of legitimacy.
Thus the constitutional revolution of the late 1930s and early 1940s
was fundamentally an interpretive revolution, a revolution stemming from
an altered consciousness, an altered epistemological sensibility. Why did
it occur at that precise point in time? Here one must resist monocausal
explanations. A variety of political, social, and economic pressures sur-
compare his opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-16
(1922), where he assumes the role of the judge enforcing first principles of republican govern-
ment embodied in the Contract and Due Process Clauses, with his invocations of the majori-
tarian basis of the police power in cases such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525,
567-71 (1923). But Holmes, after all, was born in 1841. Many New Deal judges born late in
the nineteenth or in the twentieth century, such as Frankfurter, Douglas, and Black, articulated
a theory of constitutionalism firmly grounded in democratic theory and the premise of majority
rule. See White, First Amendment Comes of Age, supra note 18, for a discussion of the emer-
gence of democratist as distinguished from republicanist constitutionalism in the period between
the two World Wars.
195. See supra Part I.C.
196. For an extended discussion of the ideas in the above paragraph, see supra Part II.
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faced in American culture in the first three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, producing novel cases and putting pressure on the adaptive capacity
of the doctrines and distinctions of traditionalist constitutional jurispru-
dence. And as that capacity was strained, the Holmesian critique began
to take hold, centering on the argument that traditional doctrines and dis-
tinctions were not essentialist but judicially created."9
There was thus more pressure for the Constitution to function as a
"living" document, and simultaneously, more Americans who had come
to believe that it and all legal documents were necessarily "living." By
1942 and Wickard, only Stone and Roberts remained from the Court who
had decided Carter v. Carter Coal Co.198 The remaining justices were
persons who had not only witnessed the economic and political disloca-
tions associated with the New Deal, but had participated, directly or indi-
rectly, in the federal government's efforts to fashion a legislative re-
sponse to those dislocations. Their working experience appeared to
confirm the modernist proposition that humans could control their imme-
diate environment rather than being fated to endure it.
Rather than seeing the constitutional revolution of the New Deal as a
product of the Court-packing crisis, it is more profitable to think of the
Court-packing crisis as a product of a constitutional revolution, one
whose "revolutionary" features were, at bottom, epistemologically cen-
197. This Article is not the place to develop an extensive historical explanation for why the
interpretive "revolution" emerged when it did, namely in the first three decades of the twentieth
century. I will develop that explanation in my forthcoming book.
At this point, however, I might sketch out the principal variables that in my judgment
interacted to produce conditions favorable for the emergence of the "revolution" in that time
period. One variable I have already described in some detail: the emergence to a position of
influence, and then of juristic orthodoxy, of the set of epistemological assumptions I have iden-
tified with "modernist" jurisprudence. The emergence of those assumptions was a necessary
but not a sufficient condition for the "revolution's" emergence between approximately 1900 and
1930. At least three "cataclysmic events" in the realm of American political economy should
also be given prominence; my hypothesis is that the "revolution" appeared at the time it did
because of a complex interaction between the assumptions of modernist epistemology and those
events. In chronological order, those events were a widening gulf, and the associated percep-
tion of that gulf, between the economic wealth, status, and power of elites and nonelites in
American society between the 1870s and the dawning of the twentieth century; the cultural dis-
locations fostered by World War I and its immediate aftermath; and the "Great Depression" of
the early 1930s, whose symbolic event was the "crash" of the stock market in October 1929. In
my view, those "cataclysmic events" both facilitated and were given special meaning by mod-
ernist epistemology after the 1930s. The result was a "revolution" in American attitudes
toward governance, which included a new attitude toward constitutional adaptivity.
198. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). In Carter Coal, the Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935, a comprehensive New Deal regulatory scheme intended to stabilize
the coal industry, on the ground that it was an unconstitutional extension of the federal govern-
ment's power to regulate "commerce."
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tered. By assuming that the Supreme Court of the United States could be
"packed" with persons who would be sympathetic to the political goals of
the Roosevelt Administrations, and who would translate that sympathy
into constitutional doctrine, the proponents of Court-packing were taking
as a given that America was a government of men. Theirs was a mod-
ernist, "living" view of constitutional theory. They had come through
the crisis of adaptivity on the winning side.
